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LEAVING MONEY ON THE TABLE: DO 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS FAIL TO FILE 
CLAIMS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS?  
JAMES D. COX* 
RANDALL S. THOMAS** 
Commencing two decades ago, and continuing today, the institutional 
investor is the most significant focus in reform efforts for securities markets 
and the American corporation. Whether the question is the type of 
disclosures that must be made in connection with a public offering,1 the 
scope of nonpublic offerings,2 or making the corporation more responsive to 
owners,3 the focus is on the significant trading and ownership interest of 
institutional investors. As is well understood, such emphasis on financial 
institutions in reforming corporate and securities laws is based upon their 
ownership of, and trading in, the stock of publicly held corporations. For 
example, financial institutions own nearly 50% of the equity securities listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and account for approximately 
75% of the daily trading volume on the NYSE.4 The ownership and trading 
 * Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
 ** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
 We would like to thank Edward Labaton, the Institute for Law and Economic Policy, and its 
members for their assistance in gathering the data used in this project. We gratefully acknowledge the 
research assistance of Carl C. Carl, Katherine Knight Schultz, and Jian Wang. 
 1. The SEC’s integrated disclosure procedures and shelf registration process is heavily 
dependent upon the view that the securities of companies eligible to use the integrated disclosure 
system are traded in an efficient market. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-6383 (Mar. 3, 1982), 47 Fed. Reg. 11,819 (Mar. 19, 1982); Randall S. Thomas & 
James F. Cotter, Measuring Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 109 (Summer 2000). That determination in part rests upon a belief that 
institutional investors are both significant traders and owners of such securities. 
 2. Though Rule 144A is technically a resale exemption, not an issuer exemption, it was 
developed to facilitate capital raising by issuers by permitting securities to be effectively syndicated to 
financial institutions, qualified institutional buyers, who are generally defined as an entity having a 
securities portfolio of at least $100 million. Institutional investors also are swept within the definition 
of an accredited investor to whom the issuer has no obligation to provide investment information as a 
condition of selling its securities. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2001) (Securities Act Rule 502(a)); 17 
C.F.R. § 230.506 (2001) (Securities Act Rule 506). 
 3. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 811 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The 
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991). Cf., Edward B. Rock, 
The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 
(1991). 
 4. At the close of the third quarter of 2001 financial institutions held 50.8% of all publicly 
traded equities. See NYSE Fact Book 2000, at 61 (citing Federal Reserve Board “Flow of Funds,” 
available at www.federalreserve.gov). The best indication of the overall volume of institutional 
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percentages are equally high for securities listed on the North American 
Securities Dealers Exchange (Nasdaq).5  
Though we also champion the vast potential that has been accorded 
institutional investors, we examine here one area where financial institutions 
are claimed to be guilty of passivity equal to that of the “small investors”: do 
financial institutions fail to submit claims for their losses in settled securities 
class actions? In other words, do institutions frequently leave money on the 
table that is theirs for the asking?  
I. THE UNEVEN ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR IN PROSECUTING 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
In their now classic article, Professors Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman 
marshalled data collected from eighty-two class action settlements to reveal 
that the fifty largest claimants in these class actions had an average allowed 
loss of $597,000 and accounted for 57.5% of the total allowed loss.6 More 
significantly, the largest and the second-largest claimants accounted for 
13.1% and 6.7%, respectively, of the total recognized losses of a subset of 
twenty class actions within their overall sample.7 From this finding, Weiss 
and Beckerman argued that judges considering settlements in securities class 
actions should harness the economic self-interest of such a larger claimant(s) 
by designating those with significant losses as the suit’s lead plaintiffs.8 
Doing so would address the broadly recognized concern that class actions are 
“lawyer driven,” and that it is the economic interests of the classes’ attorneys, 
not the classes’ representatives, that decide such important issues as whether 
the claim should be prosecuted, settled, or pursued to the next level.9 Though 
trading is the data regarding “block” trades, i.e., trades of a least 10,000 shares for an individual stock. 
For 2001, block trades represented 48.1% of total trading volume on the NYSE, a decline however 
from a high of 57% in 1995. Id. at 99. More generally, see Jerome Markam, Protecting the 
Institutional Investor—Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345, 347-48 (1995). 
 5. The data set forth supra note 4 regarding institutional holdings of traded equities does not 
distinguish between NYSE- and Nasdaq-listed securities. However, Nasdaq reports that at the end of 
2000 some 40.3% of the Nasdaq National Market Securities was held by institutions (whereas 
institutions owned 37.8% of all Nasdaq-traded securities, which rises to 47.4% when measured by 
value). http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/Sec4TSO.asp. Block trades represent 25% of the 
trading volume in Nasdaq National Market Securities. See http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/ 
Sec4Blockvol.asp. 
 6. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2089 (1995). 
 7. Id. at 2090. 
 8. Id. at 2105-09. 
 9. The literature on this point is vast. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private 
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 
215 (1983); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
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Weiss and Beckerman reasoned that courts had the inherent power to take 
such steps, Congress decided not to leave such matters to the individual 
judgment of the presiding judge. Thus, with the enactment of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),10 formal procedures for 
the appointment of a lead plaintiff were mandated for securities fraud class 
actions. 
Section 21D(a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act11 sets forth the 
procedures and criteria for the appointment of lead plaintiffs. Within twenty 
days of the filing of the complaint, notice must be published “in a widely 
circulated national business-oriented publication or wire service” inviting 
class members to apply to be the suit’s representative.12 Not later than ninety 
days after the publication of such notice, the court must appoint a lead 
plaintiff from those who have applied.13 The most significant factor 
supporting a presumption of who is the “most adequate plaintiff” is the 
claimant that “has the largest financial interest” in the suit.14 The next 
provision underscores the strength of this presumption by providing that it 
can only be overcome by proof that the party having the largest financial 
interest will not adequately represent the class or is subject to unique 
defenses.15  
Thus far, the debate surrounding the selection of a lead plaintiff has 
focused on the propriety of aggregating investor losses so as to enjoy the 
benefits of the before-described presumption.16 This, of course, is not just a 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
669 (1986); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
533 (1997); John Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Actions and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1991); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A 
Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (1993). 
 10. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-47, 109 Stat. 937 (1995). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2001). 
 12. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i). Additional notice can be required by the presiding court. Id. at 
§ 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
 13. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). 
 14. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). The other two factors listed are that the designee was the party 
to the original complaint or petitioned to be the lead plaintiff and “otherwise satisfies the requirements 
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. Since any plaintiff must meet the latter 
requirement, and the court is unlikely to be disposed to seek out a representative who is not before it, 
the relative size of the claimant naturally becomes the determining factor of whether the presumption 
applies. 
 15. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II). 
 16. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of 
Lead Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 65-78 (Spring/Summer 2001) 
(arguing tht aggregation weakens the relationship between lead plaintiff and class counsel); R. Chris 
Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs 
under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1220-21 (1999) (suggesting that courts must restrain 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p855 Cox Thomas book pages.doc 1/13/2003   12:51 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
858 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:855 
 
 
 
 
 
tussle among competing class members but has serious ramifications for the 
plaintiffs’ securities bar. Under the PSLRA, the lead plaintiff, subject to the 
approval of the court, has the power to select and retain counsel.17 Any doubt 
about a class counsel’s stakes regarding who is the lead plaintiff was resolved 
by In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig.,18 where initially Mr. Mazza was 
appointed lead plaintiff because he had the greatest loss among the five 
applicants.19 Mr. Mazza’s selection of Firm A as class counsel was 
approved.20 Later, he withdrew as lead plaintiff for personal reasons.21 
Thereafter, following motions to be appointed as lead plaintiff to replace Mr. 
Mazza, the Minami family and Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund were 
appointed co-lead plaintiffs.22 The Minami family’s losses of $900,000 were 
the greatest among the other petitioners, and Local 144’s losses of $600,000 
were deemed to qualify it as co-lead plaintiff.23 They each had their own 
choice of counsel: Firm B for the Minami family and Firm C for Local 144.24 
Both requests were approved by the court, with the effect that the Firm A 
ceased to be engaged in the suit25 and could only watch from the sidelines as 
the parties entered into a subsequent settlement that ultimately resulted in the 
new class counsel being awarded $27.6 million.26 Thus, who is the lead 
plaintiff matters, and matters a lot, to the attorneys who seek to represent the 
class. 
Because class counsel appointments depend upon who is selected as the 
lead plaintiff,27 the lead plaintiff provision effectively stimulates a 
tournament among competing attorneys to identify themselves with investors 
whose losses are so significant that they may qualify as the most adequate 
plaintiff. As such, the lead plaintiff provision has not eliminated the strong 
aggregation to avoid lawyers assembling groups in ways that restore control over the litigation to 
themselves). 
 17. Section 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(V). 
 18. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,632 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 19. Id. at 97,736 n.10. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 97,740 n.37. 
 27. And, with the decision in In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001), the 
lead plaintiff is all the more important in identifying who will be class council. Cendant held that in 
most instances where the court has appointed a lead plaintiff, it would be inappropriate for the trial 
court to select counsel through a competitive bidding process. Prior to Cendant, many courts severed 
the process of appointing lead plaintiff from the selection of counsel and discharged the latter 
responsibility by inviting interested firms to engage in competitive bidding. See generally Fisch, supra 
note 16, at 78-95. 
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interest of class counsel in the initiation of securities class actions; they 
remain lawyer-driven notwithstanding the PSLRA.28  
Table 1 presents the results of our search of the Westlaw ALLFED library 
database for opinions bearing on courts’ appointments of lead plaintiffs. 
Between January 1, 1996, and December 15, 2001, we found thirty-six 
reported opinions dealing with the presiding court’s selection of a lead 
plaintiff.  
Table 1 
SUMMARY OF FIVE-YEAR HISTORY OF SELECTING LEAD PLAINTIFF 
Cases without an Institutional Petitioner 11
Cases with Competing Institutional Petitioners 12
Cases with Single Institutional Petitioner and Institutional Petitioner Selected 8
Individual/Group Selected Over Institution 5
 
The above data seems to show that when there is a contest between a 
financial institution and an individual, or group of individuals, vying to be 
the lead plaintiff, the institution generally is determined to be the most 
adequate plaintiff. In twenty out of twenty-five cases where institutions 
applied to be lead plaintiffs, they were selected. However, our curiosity is 
piqued by the absence of a petitioning institutional investor in one-third of 
our sample. We also wonder what happened in the five instances in which 
the court selected a group of individuals over the petitioning institution. 
Our intuition is that, on average, institutional investors are more likely to 
trade significantly larger blocks of shares than individuals over time. We 
further speculate that institutional trading overall is more likely to represent a 
significant percentage of the trading in a company’s shares during the class 
action interval in a securities fraud settlement. If this so, why then do we see 
that in a significant portion of the reported decisions appointing a lead 
plaintiff, there is not any financial institution seeking to represent the class? 
And, in the few instances where a group of individuals was preferred over a 
petitioning financial institution, why were they preferred? Why were there 
not other financial institutions who sought to be appointed that had larger 
losses, larger than both those of the institution that did petition and also those 
 
 
 28. See, e.g., In re Raxorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp.2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing 
the contest among law firms who competed to be counsel for a securities class action by advancing 
their respective candidates to be the lead plaintiff. The court concluded that “the instant case illustrates 
. . . securities class litigation continues to be lawyer-driven in material respects and the reforms 
Congress contemplated in the Reform Act can be achieved, if at all, only with some help from the 
courts”). Id. at 307. 
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of the group of individuals ultimately appointed lead counsel?  
In section IV, we further address these concerns indirectly, by examining 
another phenomenon: whether institutions not only fail to step up to be a lead 
plaintiff, but whether they also fail to submit claims to the settlement 
administrator who is dispensing funds from settled securities class actions. 
However, we first need to make clear the institutional investors’ obligations, 
or lack thereof, to file suit or make claims in these cases.  
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AS A FIDUCIARY  
What are the legal compulsions for the institutional investor to petition to 
be a lead plaintiff? To file a claim in a settled case? Should the institutional 
investor on both counts just stay in bed? When the institutional investor, such 
as an investment bank, acts for its own account, it has no obligation except 
the general social obligation to take care of itself without being a burden to 
others. Thus, it might refuse to harness its self-interest to the prosecution of 
the securities class action. And should it choose not to file a claim when the 
case is settled, its slovenly action is celebrated by other class members 
because there is more money to distribute to them. However, typically 
institutional investors are acting as representatives for others. As such, they 
are easily classified as fiduciaries. The source of this obligation varies from 
institution to institution, but as will be seen, their obligation to file claims in 
settled securities class actions appears not to vary. This fiduciary command, 
however, falls on the fund’s managers, not on the institution itself.29  
A. Private Pension Funds 
Since 1974, the fount of private pension funds managers’ fiduciary 
obligations has been the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), which, among other features, sets forth certain fiduciary 
obligations.30 The fiduciary obligation provisions of ERISA are a central 
aspect of its protections of employee benefit rights.31 The exact boundaries of 
ERISA’s fiduciary requirements are decided within its broad command in 
 29. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2112 (“It is the managers of the institutional 
investors, not the institutions themselves, that are fiduciaries.”). On the general topic of the fiduciary 
responsibilities of the institution as a lead plaintiff, see Craig C. Martin & Mathew H. Metcalf, The 
Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381 (2001). 
 30. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (2001). 
 31. See generally Deborah A. Geier, ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 35 
CASE W. RES. 743, 746 (1985). The Act’s duties extend not only to one who exercises control over the 
fund, but also to those who render advice. Id. at 747-48. 
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section 404 that imposes on managers a duty to use the degree of skill, care, 
and prudence of a reasonable person “in a like capacity and familiar with 
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and 
with like aims.”32 Though this standard has a similar ring to that found in 
everyday tort law decisions, it is generally understood that ERISA is even 
more exacting in its demands than what prevails at common law.33 ERISA 
also imposes an affirmative obligation of loyalty on fund managers by its 
requirement that these plan fiduciaries must discharge their duties solely in 
the interests of the fund’s participants and beneficiaries.34  
The fiduciary duty embodied in ERISA can be traced to the common law 
of trusts and therefore embodies the obligation to preserve and maintain fund 
assets.35 It is on this foundation that Professors Weiss and Beckerman 
extrapolate an obligation for fund managers to consider initiating suit where 
necessary to protect, maintain, or reclaim fund property that is the subject of 
their trust.36 Pursuit, however, is not mandated if the manager’s decision not 
to act is reasonably based. Thus, in McMahon v. McDowell, the court held an 
ERISA fiduciary did not breach its duty to the fund by failing to take steps to 
enforce a claim, and could even abandon the claim, if the fiduciary 
reasonably believed that action would be futile.37  
This holding has significant implications for our interpretation of 
PSLRA’s provisions. Because the PSLRA bars discovery prior to the court’s 
consideration of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the information bearing 
on the suit’s merits that is available even to the most sophisticated investor is 
extremely limited.38 Hence, to the extent there are nontrivial costs to an 
institution from petitioning to become a lead plaintiff, not to mention the 
uncertainty of whether the institution will be selected, these costs may weigh 
more heavily than the expected benefits to the institution from the suit, not to 
mention its participation in the suit. Thus, though the private pension fund’s 
managers may theoretically face liability for imprudently assessing whether 
to serve as a lead plaintiff for a securities class action claim, there would be 
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. 
 33. See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities: More Is Not 
Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 71 (1998). 
 34. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. The force of each of these duties is underscored by ERISA’s provision that 
damages or equitable relief can be sought against any fiduciary who breaches his or her duties under 
the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
 35. See, e.g., Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Trans., Inc., 472 
U.S. 559 (1985). 
 36. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2116. 
 37. 794 F.2d 100, 110 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 38. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for Discovery in 
Federal Securities Fraud Action, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 71 (1997). 
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many potential justifications for them to assume a posture of rational apathy. 
However, with respect to failing to submit a claim to an administrator in a 
settled action for proven losses, we think there would be far fewer instances 
in which apathy would be a reasonable response to its fiduciary 
obligations.39  
B. Public Pension Funds 
Though nonfederal public pension funds are specifically exempted from 
ERISA,40 the fiduciary obligations that apply to public pension fund 
managers are no less demanding than the ERISA standards for our purposes. 
State pension funds are governed by the general state laws pertaining to trusts 
and investments. In addition, there are special pension fund legislative 
requirements at the state, county, and even municipal levels.41 For example, 
California sets forth fiduciary obligations for its retirement pension fund in 
its Constitution, embracing a standard very similar to that found in ERISA.42 
By contrast, New York does not have either a constitutional or statutory 
standard, but because such managers are deemed trustees, they are subject to 
the common law fiduciary standard that applies to trustees generally.43 
Furthermore, a detailed list of similar fiduciary principles is set forth in the 
Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act that has 
now been adopted in sixteen states.44 Because of the great similarity in the 
 39. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2117. To be sure, if the expected payment from the 
fund was dwarfed by the cost to prepare and submit the claim, the fiduciary, consistent with its 
fiduciary obligations, could choose not to submit the claim. Beyond this limited instance, it would be 
difficult to envision bases that would be consistent with the fiduciary being rationally apathetic. 
 40. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2001). 
 41. See generally BETTY LINN KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST 
FUND MANAGEMENT (1989). 
 42. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI § 17(c) (2001) (“[D]ischarge their duties . . . with the care, skill, 
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with these matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character 
and with like aims.”). 
 43. See Krikorian, supra note 41, at 346. See also N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW §§ 176-79 
(McKinney 2001). 
 44. A trustee or other fiduciary shall discharge duties with respect to a retirement system: 
(1) solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries; 
(2) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and paying 
reasonable expenses of administering the system; 
(3) with the care, skill, and caution under the circumstances then prevailing which a prudent 
person acting in a like capacity and familiar with those matters would use in the conduct of an 
activity of like character and purpose; 
(4) impartially, taking into account any differing interests of participants and beneficiaries; 
(5) incurring only costs that are appropriate and reasonable; and 
(6) in accordance with a good-faith interpretation of the law governing the retirement program and 
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functions performed by public pension fund managers and private pension 
fund managers, and because of the nearly identical scope of their fiduciary 
obligations, there is every reason to expect that the obligations of public 
pension fund managers with respect to pursuing a securities claim will be the 
same as that for private pension fund managers.45  
C. Mutual Fund Managers 
The Investment Company Act of 194046 sought to protect investors in 
registered mutual funds by, among other steps, imposing on the fund advisors 
and their directors certain fiduciary obligations, as well as by creating a wide 
range of prophylactic requirements.47 In addition to the fiduciary obligations 
imposed by the Investment Company Act, advisors are subject to the 
demands of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.48 Furthermore, the 
Investment Company Act does not preempt state law fiduciary standards that 
apply generally to officers and directors of mutual fund companies,49 so the 
directors and managers of mutual funds have the same fiduciary obligations 
to their shareholders as do directors and managers of other corporations.50 Of 
special interest here is that the fund’s advisor, a vendor of services to the 
mutual fund company, is seen as having a fiduciary obligation to the fund 
and to the fund’s shareholders.51 In this respect, mutual funds are quite 
different from, say, General Motors, whose various suppliers of services and 
goods are not deemed to have a fiduciary relationship to General Motors’ 
system. 
The Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act § 7 (1997), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (visited Feb. 9, 2002). Section 11 of the Act imposes 
personal liability upon fiduciaries who breach an obligation under the Act. 
 45. The Uniform Act’s obligations are derived from ERISA and the law of trusts. See Steven L. 
Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act, 
51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141, 145 (1998). 
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (2001). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (2001). 
 49. See Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 245 F.3d 214, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
Congress did not intend by enacting section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act authorizing suits for 
excessive management fees to preempt state law fiduciary principles that apply to the directors’ 
decision to award excessive compensation). 
 50. See generally Symposium Panel, Mutual Fund Regulation in the Next Millennium: I. Fund 
Governance, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 431 (2001). 
 51. See TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: THE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY ACT AND THE INVESTMENT ADVISORS ACT 343 (2000) (suggesting that an advisor has a 
fiduciary relationship that calls for it to act primarily for the benefit of the other in matters connected 
to its undertaking). The advisor’s duties are determined in this regard by reference to the principles of 
common law regarding agents, and, because they are closely analogous to brokers, advisors are subject 
to more demanding standards than agents. Id. at 372. 
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stockholders. 
So understood, the mutual fund’s directors, officers, and advisors are all 
subject to a fiduciary duty to not act negligently, although negligence in this 
context involves some element of intent such that the standard is more akin 
to that of recklessness.52 Nevertheless, the objective standard applied remains 
that of the level of skill and prudence that the reasonable person would 
exercise in a similar undertaking for a similar institution.53  
D. Insurance Company Managers  
Insurance companies are exempt from the Investment Company Act54 and 
are instead regulated by state insurance codes and commissioners.55 Most 
states do not impose a fiduciary obligation on insurance companies to their 
policyholders; fiduciary duties do exist on the part of directors and officers to 
shareholders for nonmutual insurance companies.56 This said, some courts 
nevertheless have recognized that some functions are trustee-like and have 
imposed fiduciary obligations on the insurance company’s management 
when performing tasks such as collecting premiums and managing company 
funds.57 Under this view, imprudence in pursuing assets that belong to the 
insurance company would constitute a breach of fiduciary duties if company 
reserves are reduced because of management’s lack of prudence. 
When the insurance company has stockholders, the fiduciary demands on 
its directors and officers should be the same as with any corporation. 
Subsumed within the corporate directors’ and officers’ fiduciary obligations 
is the duty to be attentive to acts or practices that will harm the corporation.58 
 52. Id. at 645-46. 
 53. Id. at 657-58. 
 54. See Section 3(c)(3), 15 U.S. C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (2001). 
 55. This arrangement reflects the impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-
1015 (2001), which exempts insurance companies from most federal regulatory provisions, except the 
antitrust laws. 
 56. See Theodore Allegaert, Comment, Derivative Actions by Policyholders on Behalf of Mutual 
Insurance Companies, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (1996). 
The relationship between mutual insurance policyholders and their company derives historically 
from statutes under which mutual companies are chartered and from the contractual terms of 
issued policies. Incident to membership in a mutual company, the policyholder acquires certain 
proprietary interests, yet these interests are not fiduciary and certainly are not akin to partnership. 
In addition, membership places the policyholders in a creditor-like contractual relationship with 
the company. 
Id. 
 57. See generally id. at 1072. 
 58. Consider here the observation of In re Caremark Int’l, Inc., Derivative Litigation by 
Chancellor William Allen: 
[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporation 
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To this end, there is a well-recognized obligation for boards of directors to 
assure compliance systems and standard operating procedures that are 
reasonable given the nature of the firm’s activities.59 This obligation is 
heightened by the general awareness that class action settlements frequently 
yield large awards to financial institutions, such as those described by Weiss 
and Beckerman. Thus, it is not a big step to conclude that just as the mutual 
funds (and insurance companies) must assure the safety of the securities that 
are within the firm’s portfolio, they should also assure that appropriate 
procedures are in place to claim material amounts that may be due the mutual 
fund (or insurance company) in a class action settlement. What is material is 
a relative inquiry. In the context of filing a claim with a settlement 
administrator for a settled class action, it would seem that materiality is best 
assessed in terms of the relationship between the cost of submitting the claim 
and the expected payment from the settlement. The costs of filing such 
claims appear at first blush to be trivial, and therefore we would expect most 
funds that traded during the class period to seek a recovery. 
On the other hand, there are many more persuasive reasons that can 
support the directors’ or officers’ decision not to become a lead plaintiff. 
There is a question of the resources required to see that task through to the 
end. Those without experience in such matters may easily overestimate the 
burdens of being a lead plaintiff. Or they may correctly estimate that, given 
the firm’s limited resources, the expected benefits of such intervention on its 
part are on average insufficient reward for the effort entailed. Also, there are 
distinct advantages to free-riding on the efforts of others. If there is no reason 
to believe that the firm’s position will be improved by pursuing recovery as 
the lead plaintiff, rational apathy is both efficient and understandable.60  
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure 
to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses 
caused by noncompliance with applicable legal standards. 
698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 10.4 
(2002). 
 59. See, e.g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 60. A less acceptable reason is suggested by WILLIAM M. O’BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, 
FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING (1992). Their study of 
the culture of selected financial institutions found that, with the exception of public pension funds, 
managers were sensitive to the fact that their employer was or could be a vendor of products that the 
class action defendant consumes. Hence, a visible participation in the suit would seriously jeopardize 
the company’s, bank’s, or insurer’s long-term interests. 
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E. Bank Common Trust Funds 
Common trust funds operated by banks are exempt from the Investment 
Company Act of 1940,61 but their managers are subject to the common law 
fiduciary duties of trustees. Though the specifics of a trustee’s fiduciary duty 
varies from state to state, the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Trusts 
captures the position adhered to by most of the states: 
A fiduciary has a duty to take reasonable steps to realize on claims that 
are the property of the trust . . . but should do so only when she 
believes that the probable benefit to the trust will exceed the costs the 
trust reasonably can expect to incur. On the other hand, a fiduciary 
cannot properly abandon claims affecting the trust property unless it 
reasonably appears that a suit would be futile or the expense of 
litigation or the character of the claim would make it reasonable not to 
bring suit.62  
In short, the obligations of the bank trustee are no different from those we 
have seen apply to other fiduciaries. 
F. Synthesis: Institutions Are Normally Obligated to File Claims in 
Securities Settlements, But May Rationally Choose Not to Be Lead 
Plaintiffs 
Felix Frankfurter’s famous observation regarding fiduciaries63 
underscores the opacity that surrounds the meaning and, more particularly, 
the demands of being a fiduciary. Whatever the vagueness of fiduciary 
obligations in other contexts, in the context of the institutional investor’s 
obligations to its investors, beneficiaries, policyholders, etc., there is amazing 
uniformity. Though such institutions cannot abandon without reason a claim 
against a third party, financial institutions are not under an affirmative 
obligation to pursue inchoate claims. The speculative nature of the claim, 
coupled with the uncertainty that the institution’s decision to serve as a lead 
plaintiff will make a difference, makes apathy the reasonable and rational 
 61. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) (2001). 
 62. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2113 (citing Restatement of Trusts, Second, § 177, 
192). 
 63. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To 
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he 
failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty? 
Id. at 85-86. 
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course much of the time.  
But when the claim is no longer inchoate, so that money is to be received 
by submitting proof of the institution’s trading during the fraud interval, the 
justifiable bounds of rational apathy are seriously constricted. The benefits of 
filing and perfecting these claims are much more concrete, especially when 
the fund managers are gauging their performances in comparison to market 
benchmarks. What is then a reasonable course of action should be guided 
again by comparing the costs to submit the claim with the expected award 
from the settlement, but we expect this to be a one-sided calculation in favor 
of filing for any actively trading institution. 
III. PUTTING THE ODOR OF MONEY IN THE AIR: THE PROCEDURAL 
ASPECTS OF NOTIFYING CLAIMANTS 
Settlements of securities class actions require the approval of the court. 
The truly final disposition of the case occurs when the settlement 
administrator, who is either appointed by the court or simply selected by the 
suit’s attorneys, submits its report of how the settlement was distributed. The 
settlement administrator earns its fees not by simply writing checks, but also 
by its extensive efforts to assure that all reasonable efforts have been taken to 
give potential claimants notice of the settlement and how those investors can 
submit their claims so as to be eligible to participate in a settlement. 
Professional settlement administrators for class actions always face a 
challenging task in distributing settlement funds to those entitled to be 
members of the class. In securities class actions, not only is there the serious 
administrative task of assuring that those filing claims are entitled to 
participate in the settlement,64 but imparting notice of the settlement to class 
members is also difficult. Giving notice to potential class claimants is 
complicated by several factors.65  
The first step customarily followed by the settlement administrator is 
obtaining from the transfer agent for the security’s issuer the list of registered 
stockholders. However, if the issuer is bankrupt or otherwise not in existence 
 64. This task is further complicated when the terms of the settlement provide for differing 
recoveries within the class action period based upon when a particular claimant’s securities transaction 
occurred. 
 65. The following description of the steps settlement administrators pursue is based on numerous 
conversations the authors have had with several administrators. See also Aff. Biran Burke, In re Health 
Mgmt. Systems Sec. Litig. (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Aff. Ellen Riley, In re Physicians Computer Network, 
Inc. Sec. Litig. (D.N.J. 2000); Aff. Shandarese Garr, in In re Engelhard Sec. Litig. (D.N.J. 2000); Aff. 
Ellen Riley, Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc. (W.D. Mo. 2000); Aff. G. Peter Buchband, Wright v. BT 
Office Products Int’l, Inc. (S.D.N.Y 1999); Aff. G. Peter Buchband, State of Wis. Board v. Goldfield 
(D.N. Tex. 1999). 
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at the time of the settlement, the transfer agent generally possesses no reliable 
records. In any case, settlement administrators do not rely solely on the 
transfer agent’s records when such records are available. Because most 
investors hold their securities in street names, the list of registered holders 
from the transfer agent will report a significant number of holders as CEDE 
& Co., the depository for most brokers. The settlement administrator 
maintains in its database a list of over 2000 brokers that participate in the 
Depository Trust Company (the so-called DTC Participant List).66 Using the 
DTC Participant List, the settlement administrator forwards to each such 
broker a notice of settlement, generally with a special notice asking that the 
broker assist in informing its customers who possibly are included in the 
settlement. The brokers respond by identifying the addresses of their 
customers whose trading occurred during the class action period. They then 
either provide a printed or electronic version of the customers’ addresses or 
forward labels with the customers’ addresses. Some brokers prefer to 
circulate the claims notices directly to their customers and, therefore, obtain 
from the settlement administrator an ample supply of settlement notices that 
the broker can then forward directly to the appropriate customers. 
Institutional investors who prefer anonymity may not be totally visible to the 
settlement administrator during this stage of the administrator’s work. For 
example, an institution that depends upon an advisor or advisors to file the 
required Form 13F may not be directly identified to the settlement 
administrator so that the notice of settlement is directed to the advisor and not 
to the institution itself. When this occurs, the ball is in such advisor’s court. 
Just as for the broker whose customer holdings are recorded in street name, 
the advisor has an obligation to forward the settlement notice to the 
institution. Thus, the notices of settlement that are circulated customarily 
request that the notice be directed to the securities’ beneficial owners, if other 
than the advisor.67 A further step of circulating notice is the publication of the 
settlement notice in the national media, such as The Wall Street Journal, 
Financial Times, USA Today, or Investors Business Daily. 
 The reader should be impressed with the steps taken by settlement 
administrators to assure that those investors with claims learn of them and 
submit proof of their claim to the administrator. Assurance that their steps are 
reasonable occurs at several levels. First, all aspects of the settlement are 
 66. This list is updated annually by the Depository Trust Company (DTC).  
 67. Note that the settlement administrator does not know ex ante that the advisor’s listed 
holdings are held solely as an agent for another, although there is more than ample reason to expect 
this is true a significant percentage of the time. Thus, the settlement administrator’s request that the 
settlement notice should be forwarded is couched in less than mandatory language. 
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subject to the court’s watchful eye. Though some judicial eyes are sharper 
than others, the settlement administrators have learned to apply the highest 
standards consistently across all settlements. Courts customarily ask the 
administrator to set forth in writing all of the steps they have taken to assure 
that potential claimants are duly informed. Second, the steps followed by 
settlement administrators parallel in many respects those required by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an analogous area, the 
distribution of proxy materials, annual reports, and other company notices to 
investors. 
The SEC has long toiled in meeting the challenge of assuring that 
company communications—particularly proxy statements—could reach the 
company’s beneficial owners.68 With 70% and 80% of all outstanding shares 
held in street name,69 the SEC’s task is a formidable one. To assure that 
corporate releases reach those who have an economic stake in the company, 
the SEC rules impose a series of responsibilities upon banks and brokers who 
hold shares as nominees for the beneficial owners.70 The baseline 
requirement is that companies registered under either the Securities 
Exchange Act or the Investment Company Act of 1940 must, at least twenty 
days before the record date for a meeting, employ a search-card procedure 
whereby they ask the nominee (broker, bank, or other party) to tell them the 
number of copies of the company proxy materials they need in order to send 
them to all of the beneficial owners the nominee represents.71 Nominees are 
also required to identify the number of shares owned by each beneficial 
 68. For a complete analysis of the history and details of the SEC’s regulation in this area, see 
RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL (3d ed. 1999). 
 69. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 34-38406 (Mar. 14, 1997), 62 Fed. Reg. 13,922 (Mar. 
24, 1997). Legal title is customarily recorded in the name of CEDE & Co., the nominee of Depository 
Trust Company, an entity that owes much of its existence to the efficiency of not depending upon 
individual owners to physically delivery share certificates to an intermediary each time the securities 
are sold. 
 70. As originally enacted, section 14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act conferred upon the SEC 
very general rule-making authority regarding the obligations of broker-dealers with respect to proxy 
solicitations of their customers’ shares in companies listed on a national securities exchange. A 1964 
amendment not only expanded the scope of the SEC’s authority to over-the-counter securities but 
clarified that its authority included “requiring . . . broker-dealers to transmit proxy solicitation 
materials to their customers . . . .” See Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
The final expansion occurred in 1985 when its authority was extended to banks. See Pub. L. No. 99-
222, 99 Stat. 1737 (1985). 
 71. Exchange Act Rule 14a-13(a), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-13(a) (2001). Banks frequently are 
themselves but nominees of other banks who are nominees of another bank or the beneficial owner. 
This results in a “piggyback” system whereby each bank nominee has one day to respond by 
identifying their respondent bank. Id. 
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owner.72 
Direct mailings of routine annual reports by the company to many 
beneficial owners are also possible if the company has compiled lists of 
nonobjecting beneficial owners.73  
Thereafter, the issuer may mail its materials directly to any nonobjecting 
stockholders and provide the nominee with a sufficient number of the 
materials to be forwarded to the objecting owners.74 Alternatively, the issuer 
may provide the nominee with enough sets of the materials for all the owners 
it represents, whether they are objecting or non-objecting holders.75 As part 
of this process, the SEC has imposed an affirmative obligation upon the 
brokers and banks that serve as nominees to forward to these beneficial 
owners the proxy statements and other information given to them by the 
issuer, and to respond to requests by the issuer to provide a list of the 
nonobjecting beneficial owners.76  
There is no statutory mandate for the settlement of class actions 
equivalent to the mandate in Section 14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
with respect to the circulation of a notice of settlement. Nevertheless, the 
fiduciary relationship between customers, whether widowers or large 
financial institutions, and their broker-advisors embodies an affirmative 
command that the notices be forwarded to the beneficial owners. Moreover, 
settlement administrators pursue additional steps to assure that all possible 
participants in a settlement receive notice of a claim, not the least of which is 
publishing notice of a settlement in the national press. To be sure, advisors 
might not forward the notice, and beneficial owners may turn a blind eye to 
the reality that securities class actions are prevalent and that significant funds 
are regularly distributed to institutional claimants in such settlements.  
IV. DO INSTITUTIONS FILE CLAIMS IN SECURITIES FRAUD SETTLEMENTS?  
In recent months, there have been allegations raised in the popular press 
and elsewhere that institutional shareholders are giving up “hundreds of 
millions of dollars in class action settlements for which they are eligible 
simply by neglecting to file claims.”77 These claims, however, are based 
 72. Id. 
 73. Exchange Act Rules 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.14b-1 (2001), and 14b-2, C.F.R. 240.14b-2 
(2001), govern this process. 
 74. Exchange Act Rule 14a-13(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-13(b) (2001). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Exchange Act Rule 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.14b-1 (2001) (broker-dealers) and Rule 14b-2, 17 
C.F.R. 240.14b-2 (2001) (banks). 
 77. See, e.g., Christiane Bird, Pension Funds Miss Out on Much Cash by Failing to File in Class-
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largely on “informal and anecdotal evidence,” although there has been at 
least one attempt by the National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers 
and Treasurers to collect survey data from a broad sample of institutions.78 
This survey showed that about one-third of the thirty-three respondent 
institutions had made no recovery of any asset losses in the prior five years, a 
time period in which more than 700 securities class action cases were 
settled.79 Given the enormous share of the stock market that is held by 
institutional shareholders (25% for public pension funds and another 35% by 
corporate funds) and the tremendous amount of money available in these 
settlements (estimated at $8.39 billion over the past three years), a logical 
inference from these responses is that it is “highly unlikely any significant 
public fund invested in the market could possibly have been ineligible to 
participate in class action recoveries through this 5-year span.”80 In other 
words, it appears, based on the limited evidence compiled to date, that some 
institutional investors are not filing claims in securities fraud class action 
settlements and are therefore leaving potentially large sums of money on the 
table. 
In this section, we explain our efforts to develop a data set that can be 
used to test these claims. First, we explain how we collected our data and 
some of the strengths and limitations of the sources that we have used. Then, 
we give some very preliminary results based on the small number of 
settlements that we have been able to obtain sufficient information about to 
date. 
A. The Data  
In order to get a better sense of how many institutions are both eligible to 
make claims and actually do perfect such claims in these settlements, we 
needed to first generate a sample of securities fraud settlements. We enlisted 
the aid of three settlement administrators to help us identify a group of 
securities fraud class action settlements and asked them to send us the 
settlement notices from these cases. We used these notices to gather a wide 
variety of information about these cases, including the identity of the lead 
plaintiff for post-PSLRA cases, and the class period for each case.  
We then set about generating two additional types of data. First, for each 
Action Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2001, at A10. 
 78. Id. 
 79. ALAN P. CLEVELAND, CLASS ACTION CLAIM MANAGEMENT: A FIDUCIARY MANDATE 
(2001) (mimeo on file with author). 
 80. Id. 
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settlement for which we received a settlement notice, we considered the 
company settling the case as a potential member of our sample. For each 
sample company, we needed to determine which institutions held stock in the 
company at the beginning of the class period, and which institutions traded in 
the company’s stock over the fraud interval. To do this, we used data taken 
from Form 13Fs filed by institutional investors. In particular, we used the 
Spectrum 3 database, which lists each company for which institutional 
investors have reported stock ownership, the names of those institutional 
investors that reported holding the company’s stock, the size of the 
institutions’ share holdings in each quarter, and the changes in these 
institutions’ share holdings on a quarterly basis during the class interval. For 
those sample companies that were listed in Spectrum 3, we extracted this 
information and used it to create a spreadsheet that reflected all of the 
institutions reporting trades—and the size of those trades—in the sample 
company during the class period.81  
The reporting institutions for Form 13F include a very broad group of 
organizations. The list not only includes the types of financial institutions 
whose general fiduciary obligations were earlier examined in Part II—private 
and public pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and bank 
common funds—but also hedge funds, foundations, endowments, and even 
partnerships. This means that our sample includes a wide range of different 
types of institutional investors, allowing us to determine if different groups of 
these investors vary in the frequency with which they file claims in these 
cases. 
We realize that our reliance on data reported in Form 13Fs as our source 
of information about institutional shareholders’ stock ownership and trading 
is subject to several criticisms, including that institutions often delay 
reporting changes in their holdings on a timely basis, and that they may not 
report all changes in their stock holdings. Equally limiting is that the Form 
13F is frequently filed by an advisor to the financial institution under the 
advisor’s name and not under the name of the institution.82 These problems 
may in part be a result of the SEC’s failure to review these filings and the 
lack of financial or other penalties for late or inaccurate institutional filings.  
However, in the end, this is the only publicly available data source on 
institutional shareholder stock ownership in individual companies. The only 
alternative way of generating the data that we need on holdings and changes 
in holdings is to ask those institutions that held shares in the sample 
 81. Some companies were not listed in Spectrum 3, and are therefore not included in our sample.  
 
 82. Moreover, advisors can, and frequently do, serve more than one institution and as a matter of 
expediency aggregate their holdings for all advisees when reporting on Form 13F. 
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companies to provide us with this information directly, if they still have it. 
While we may choose to pursue this avenue farther down the road, at the 
moment we must be content with using the Spectrum 3 data to determine 
whether institutional investors have potential claims that they should file in 
these settlements.  
After we generated a list of the institutional investors that held stock in 
the sample companies and traded in the stock during the class interval, we 
examined our data to see if these institutions filed claims in the securities 
class action settlements. We asked the three settlement administrators that 
had provided us with the notices of settlements if they would be willing to 
help us determine if the institutions that we had identified as potential 
claimants actually filed claims in the settlements that they administered. We 
provided them with our spreadsheets listing the institutions that we had 
identified as trading stock in the sample companies during the class period 
and asked them to compare our list with the list of claimants in their 
databases so that we could determine how well the two data sets matched one 
another. 
One problem with this methodology is that some institutional investors 
use third-party advisors as money managers to manage some or all of their 
portfolio. In these circumstances, the third-party advisors will often be 
responsible for filing claims in securities fraud settlements. If the third-party 
advisor files the claim in its own name—not in the institutional investor’s 
name—then we also need to determine the name of the beneficial owner of 
the securities so that we can get the information that we need. For that 
reason, we asked the three settlement administrators to search their databases 
not only for those claims filed by institutional investors in their own names, 
but also for third-party advisor claims that identified the institutional 
investors as the beneficial owners. We were informed that they would 
provide us with lists designating such beneficial owners. 
One of the settlement administrators, who we will call Admin One, made 
the comparisons that we asked for for a group of forty-one sample companies 
and sent us a spreadsheet listing all of the institutional shareholders that we 
had identified; whether they had made a claim or not; the size of the claim 
that they made, if any; and the amount of their recovery. Admin One advised 
us that they believed that they were able to accurately determine roughly 
85% to 90% of the time whether the institutions that we had identified as 
potential claimants had made claims or not. They reported that they believed, 
based on their prior experience in administering settlements, that the third-
party advisors probably omitted to provide complete information about the 
beneficial ownership of some subset of the remaining 10% to 15% of the 
institutions we identified. Thus, for the sample of companies that we 
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obtained from Admin One, we recognize that our data probably contain a 
reasonable number of omitted claims. We cannot correct the data for this 
problem without additional information from the institutional investors 
themselves. 
The other two settlement administrators, Admin Two and Admin Three, 
gave us different sets of information. Admin Two provided us with two sets 
of data about eleven sample companies: the first was a summary list of all 
claimants, including the size of their losses and amounts of their awards; the 
second was a more detailed listing of the particulars of each claimant’s 
trading in the sample company’s securities during the class period. Using this 
information, we were able to pull out a list of institutional investors making 
claims and the size of their claims that we compared to our data on the 
institutional investors that were eligible to make claims in these cases. As 
with the data provided by Admin One, there are undoubtedly some claims 
misidentified as being made by third-party advisors, which should be 
classified as being made by institutions. We anticipate this error to affect our 
sample data for the same reasons given by Admin One. We note that we 
were unable to identify as many of the beneficial owners for claims filed by 
banks acting as custodians in the Admin Two data set because of the way the 
data were given to us. This will have the effect of decreasing the number of 
(usually small) claimants that we can identify because their claims are filed 
by the banks that are the custodians for their shares.83  
Admin Three provided us only with a list of the largest 100 actual 
claimants for a sample of ten companies. We should be able to compare this 
list with the data that we had assembled on institutional investor holdings. 
However, we cannot determine for those institutions whose names do not 
appear on the list of the largest claimants if they actually filed claims. At the 
time of this writing, Admin Three has not provided us with any further data 
in this regard to this point. As a result, we decided to wait until we received 
more information from Admin Three before continuing to work with their 
data.  
B. Preliminary Analysis  
From the data provided by Admin One and Admin Two, we were able to 
perform some preliminary statistical analysis. Despite the differences in the 
 83. To make the data more comparable between the Admin One and Admin Two data sets, we 
will need to aggregate all of the beneficial owners claiming through banks in the Admin One data set. 
Although this will reduce the number of identified claimants, it will result in creating comparable 
numbers of institutional investor claims. 
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two data sets, we extracted similar sets of results from them. For both 
samples, all of the settlements involved purchaser classes. We were able to 
determine the number of Form 13F filers that had reported purchases during 
the sample period and to compare that list with the names of the beneficial 
owners that were filing claims in the settlements. Thus, we are able to 
calculate the percentage of Form 13F traders that file claims in each 
settlement. Table 2 sets forth this information by sample company, as well as 
data on the average size of the claim for each institution that filed a claim. 
We note that we have incomplete information on several of the companies 
(indicated by dashes and not included in the totals for any of the columns). 
Table 2 
ADMIN ONE DATA ON SETTLEMENTS; 13F DATA ON FILING 
 
Sample 
Company 
Number 
Number 
Filing 
Number 
Trading 
Percentage 
Filing 
Av. Loss 
(dollars) 
1  4 22 18.18% 29,813 
2  121 265 45.66% 19,640 
3  3 29 10.34% 102,466 
4  2 76 2.63% 13,998 
5  1 41 2.44% 55,975 
6  71 312 22.76% 26,317 
7  0 13 0% —— 
8  4 47 8.51% 8,049 
9  —— —— —— —— 
10  9 73 12.33% 328,006 
11  11 83 13.25% 54,152 
12  —— —— —— —— 
13  25 76 32.89% 215,947 
14  12 108 11.11% 10,178 
15  7 22 31.82% 166,915 
16  —— —— —— —— 
17  2 35 5.71% 270,811 
18  2 12 16.67% 39,522 
19  —— —— —— —— 
20  20 54 37.04% 137,309 
21  —— —— —— —— 
22  —— —— —— —— 
23  —— —— —— —— 
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Sample 
Company 
Number 
Number 
Filing 
Number 
Trading 
Percentage 
Filing 
Av. Loss 
(dollars) 
24  221 820 26.95% 45,912 
25  601 1,345 44.68% 2,551 
26  180 452 39.82% 5,983 
27  5 19 26.32% 17,467 
28  0 6 —— —— 
29  31 145 21.38% 38,450 
30  0 8 —— —— 
31  1 47 2.13% 26,371 
32  39 180 21.67% 218,139 
33  0 18 —— —— 
34  1 13 7.69% 775,395 
35  15 54 27.78% 2,228 
36  —— —— —— —— 
37  4 49 8.16% 31,915 
38  0 4 —— —— 
39  12 37 32.43% 133,270 
40  385 961 40.06% 5,803 
41  2 34 5.89% 91,463 
42  0 4 —— —— 
     
Total/Averages 1,791 5,464 32.78% 102,644 
 
The Admin Two data gave us a slightly different look at the settlement 
process. They provided us disaggregated data on all of the claims made in 
each of the settlements, although they did not match our list of Form 13F 
filers with their database for us. While there remains much analysis to be 
done on the information they provided us, at this point we choose to generate 
results that are comparable in nature to those shown above. In Table 3, we 
present the same percentage of Form 13F traders that filed claims in each 
settlement, as well as data on the average size of the claim made by each 
institution.  
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Table 3 
ADMIN TWO DATA ON SETTLEMENTS; 13F DATA ON FILING 
Sample 
Company 
Number 
Number 
Filing 
Number 
Trading 
Percentage 
Filing 
Average  
Loss (dollars)
Recovery 
Percentage 
Average 
Award 
(dollars) 
1 2 7 28.6% 263,050 18.89% 46,690 
2 11 60 18.5% 705,275 48.79% 344,104 
3 8 27 29.6% 356,448 5.25% 18,714 
4 2 8 25.0% 127,500 49.26% 62,807 
5 0 1 0% —— N/A —— 
6 8 51 15.7% 150,507 12.12% 18,241 
7 14 55 25.5% 48,227 23.91% 11,531 
8 7 25 28.0% 322,971 N/A N/A 
9 13 50 26.0% 657,216 5.84% 38,281 
10 17 90 18.89% 1,919,254 N/A N/A 
11 37 144 25.69% 60,289 100.23% 60,428 
       
Total/ 
Averages 119 517 23.01% 461,074* 
 
33.04%** 
 
75,112** 
* Excluding Case 5. 
**Excluding Cases 5, 8 and 10.  
The most obvious result that can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 is the low 
percentage of Form 13F traders that appear to file claims in these settlements. 
Looking at the last row of each table, we have calculated the averages across 
all of the settlements in the two samples to give the reader a flavor of the 
data. Looking across this row in Table 2, we find an average filing 
percentage for eligible claims of 32.78%, whereas in Table 3, the average 
percentage of Form 13F filers perfecting their claims is 23.01%.84 If all those 
institutions filing Form 13Fs indicating trades during the class period were 
also filing and perfecting claims in these settlements, we would see 100% 
averages here. 
Average loss is substantial in both samples. For Table 2, the average loss 
is $102,644; in Table 3, the average loss is $461,074. Although there are 
some large variations across the different settlements, the magnitude of these 
averages would seem to indicate that many institutions have suffered 
significant losses in these cases. Of course, what determines the value of 
filing a claim is not the loss suffered, but the recovery expected. Here, our 
 
 
 84. Note that this is the percentage of filers whose claims are filed and accepted as valid by the 
settlement administrators. At present, we are not calculating the percentage of 13F filers who file 
claims that are disallowed. Based on our review of the data, adding these ineligible claimants would 
slightly increase the number of filers in some settlements. 
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data is less complete, as we are only able to calculate average awards for the 
settlements in Table 3. With due regard for the small number of settlements 
in this group, we can see that average recovery rates are about one-third of 
losses, resulting in an average award for those eight companies of $75,112. 
To our eyes, this would seem to be a significant return on the small costs (in 
terms of time and money) of filing a claim in a securities fraud class action 
settlement.  
One implication of the recovery percentages in the Admin Two data set 
should also be pointed out. As these percentages are for the most part below 
100%, increasing the number of claims filed by institutional investors will 
result in lower average recoveries for all of these investors. This will have the 
effect of reducing the monetary incentives for these shareholders to file 
claims, although we cannot be sure by how much. 
We repeat again that caution must be exercised in interpreting these 
numbers. While we are sure that there is some under-reporting of claimants 
due to problems in determining with complete accuracy the identities of the 
institutions filing claims in the settlements, we believe, based on our 
conversations with the settlement administrators, that their process accurately 
identifies a high percentage of the beneficial owners that file in these 
settlements. In addition, the Form 13F data itself may be inaccurate, although 
we note in this regard that institutions that fail to file Form 13Fs are not 
included in our sample. In fact, we only include those institutions that report 
their purchases during the class period, which should understate the number 
of institutions that could file claims in the settlements because it excludes 
institutions that traded during the class interval but failed to timely report 
these trades on their Form 13Fs. Thus, we believe that we have been 
conservative in selecting the trading institutions that we are seeking to match 
up with the filing institutions in the settlements. Of course, we would prefer 
to correct for these problems before concluding that our results will hold up, 
but at this point, we do not see how we can make these corrections without 
getting information from the institutions themselves, assuming that the 
information still exists and that the institutions would be willing to share it.  
V. WHY AREN’T INSTITUTIONS FILING?: A RESEARCH AGENDA 
We have attempted to answer the question of whether institutional 
investors are leaving money on the table by failing to file claims in securities 
fraud class actions. We think that their fiduciary duties to file such claims are 
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clearly established by existing law85 and that the costs of filing such claims 
are likely to be trivial. Thus, even if the benefits from filing are small, 
institutional investors should be filing claims in these settlements. 
We conclude that it appears that many of these investors are failing to file 
such claims. Despite all of the flaws in our data, the percentage of 
institutional investors that we can identify that are actually filing such claims 
is well below the number that should be filing these claims. At the same time, 
the average recoveries in these settlements seem well in excess of what 
would cover the costs of making such claims. While we are well aware that 
there are those in the field that believe otherwise—and we stand ready to be 
convinced by further evidence—we think that we have offered the most 
complete picture of the problem to date.86  
What we lack most at the moment is a convincing explanation of why 
these institutions are not filing claims in all securities fraud class action 
settlements. Two potential explanations have been offered: first, that there 
are potential misunderstandings by institutions of the amount that they can 
recover in these cases;87 and second, that these shareholders do not 
understand that filing claims is part of their legal duty to their beneficiaries.88  
Based on comments that we have received from attorneys that practice in 
the area, and based on our own research, we think that there are several more 
plausible hypotheses that should be explored. One strong candidate as an 
explanation is that institutions are rational economic beings that make cost-
benefit calculations concerning whether or not to file claims in these 
settlements. They may expect to receive small recoveries in these cases, even 
if their losses are large, because some settlements pay out only pennies on the 
dollar. Or the recovery amounts may seem large to outsiders but may be very 
small in relationship to the size of the institutions’ portfolios and therefore 
have no material impact on their returns. We think that this is an important 
avenue for further research that we intend to pursue. In particular, we need to 
inquire further into the underlying claims for the different institutions to look 
at the distribution of claims, and we need to ask such questions as whether 
 85. It bears repeating that the Form 13F filers are a diverse lot. They are not restricted to large 
public pension funds that are often discussed when considering shareholder activism, nor even to 
institutions that have fiduciary obligations to a set of beneficial owners. We hope to refine our results 
to try to sort out the different types of institutions into different categories as we work further with the 
data that we have and hope to get in the future. 
 86. We note that our results are consistent with those in the only other systematic attempt to 
address this issue of which we are aware. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 79. 
 87. Douglas McKeige, Leaving Money on the Table: Are You Collecting on Your Claims?, 3 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOCATE 1 (2001). 
 88. Cleveland, supra note 79. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p855 Cox Thomas book pages.doc 1/13/2003   12:51 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
880 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:855 
 
 
 
 
 
the average figures reported in Tables 2 and 3 conceal a large number of 
small claimants for whom filing will result in small gains. We also need to 
look at the average recoveries for those institutions that did not file claims in 
order to calculate what they would have recovered if they had filed. 
Furthermore, we intend to get a better handle on the costs of filing claims and 
whether these costs vary significantly over different investors with different 
trading volumes and patterns. We also intend to consider the level of detail 
that is required for perfecting the claims. More generally, we intend to 
examine the effect of the size of the settlement, the size of the individual 
institution’s potential recovery, the size of the institution’s stake in the 
company being sued in the case, the size of the case (including how well 
publicized the settlement is), and the length of time between the settlement 
and the time that the claims arose. All of these are important factors in 
determining filing rates for institutional investors. 
A second potentially important explanation for the institutions’ failure to 
file claims is that they do not have personnel that are assigned to handle these 
claims. In other words, if the notice of settlement comes in, who does it get 
routed to? If it goes to the trading desk, the traders may believe that their job 
is to make money for the firm through the purchase and sale of securities, not 
by filing claims. Thus, they may do nothing with the claim. Similarly, if the 
institutional investor is delegating the responsibility for filing claims to the 
custodian of their securities, typically a bank or broker, the custodian may 
fail to understand what it needs to do in order to file and perfect a claim. 
Many potential pitfalls of this nature may exist at different institutions and 
play a major role in explaining their failures to file. 
A third possible reason for institutions’ failure to file claims may be that 
they never receive the notices of settlement. Most institutions hold their stock 
in street name, with the beneficial owners holding legal title through a 
depository trust.89 When a company settles a securities fraud case, the notice 
of settlement must filter its way through the chain from the depository trust, 
to the broker or bank holding the shares in the institution’s name, all the way 
down to the institutional investor. There is no legal obligation imposed on the 
banks or brokers to insure that these notices arrive at the door of the 
institutional investors.90 So we cannot be sure that institutions are even aware 
of the settlements when they arise.  
 89. Thomas & Dixon, supra note 68. 
 90. If it turns out that many notices are not being received by the institutions, then it may be 
necessary for the SEC to consider implementing rules that require banks and brokers to forward these 
notices to all the beneficial holders whose shares that they hold. New rules analogous to those adopted 
for shareholder voting would seem to be in order. See Thomas & Dixon, supra note 68. 
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These potential explanations for institutional investors’ failure to file 
calaims in securities fraud class action settlements may also be 
complementary. In other words, some institutions may decide not to file 
because the returns are too small, others may not file because they are not 
receiving notice of the settlements, and a third group may not have personnel 
assigned to process claims. 
The policy implications of our results depend importantly on which 
hypotheses are correct and if so, what the costs and benefits are of addressing 
them. For example, it might be relatively cheap for the SEC to draft rules to 
address widespread failures in the system that notify institutions of class 
action settlements. It would be more costly to require institutions to assign 
personnel to process claims in these settlements. Finally, it may or may not 
be even more expensive to create a legal duty to file claims even where the 
dollar amounts of the claims are low. We look forward to addressing these 
issues more fully in later research. 
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